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This paper discusses the internal processes and decisions that characterized the 
transition from collectively held group ranches to individualized property systems among 
the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado district in Kenya. It addresses the question of why 
group ranch members would demand individualized property systems, but then turn 
against the outcome. In addressing this puzzle the paper discusses the process of land 
allocation and distribution during group ranch subdivision. It examines who the main 
actors were during subdivision, their degree of latitude in crafting and changing rules, 
and the interactions between Maasai and state institutions. Findings suggest that, because 
the process by which property rights change is so intertwined with politics, we may need 
to move beyond economic models of relative price changes and state enforcement in 
order to better understand such transitions. Models that accommodate competition by 
actors and the possibility that state actors may not provide the arbitration or enforcement 
that is often taken for granted are more useful for analyzing the complexities of shifting 
property rights. When the possibility for conflict and competition is factored into the 
property rights equation, the relative gains from privatizing/individualizing may not be as 
large or as obvious as anticipated.  
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Subdividing the Commons: The Politics of Property Rights 
Transformation in Kenya’s Maasailand 
 
Esther Mwangi 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Much effort has been spent in identifying factors that motivate the transformation 
of property rights towards increased privatization, or in explicating the desirable 
outcomes of such transitions (deAlessi 2003; Anderson and Hill 2003, 1975; North and 
Thomas, 1975; Demsetz, 1967). Considerably less information exists on the processes 
that translate individual or group motivations into outcomes (Banner 2002; Neale 1998; 
Bardhan, 1989; Feeny, 1988). The forces underlying property rights transformations have 
been found to be largely economic such as relative price changes or technological 
innovation (Ruttan 1997; North 1990; Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Boserup 1965), and state 
enforcement of the new property structure has been taken as a given. There is less 
understanding, however, of how the solution of individual property is reached or what 
makes the new property assignment binding. A better understanding of process may help 
in the assessment of gains made by the transformation to individual property structure. 
Some scholars indicate that the process of defining property rights may preclude any 
gains realized by the establishment of such rights (Libecap 2003; Anderson and Hill 
1975). More generally, understanding change processes not only provide a basis for 
interpreting policy outcomes, but also establishes a locus for informing intended reform 




This paper discusses the internal processes and decisions that characterized the 
transition from collectively held group ranches
1 to individualized property systems 
among the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado district in Kenya. It addresses the question of 
why group ranch members would demand individualized property systems, but then turn 
against the outcome. How could rational individuals, who made measured and thoughtful 
decisions to achieve a desired outcome, fail to achieve their outcome of interest? In 
addressing this puzzle the paper discusses the process of land allocation and distribution 
during group ranch subdivision. It examines who the main actors were during 
subdivision, their degree of latitude in crafting and changing rules, and the interactions 
between Maasai and state institutions.  
It finds that even though ordinary Maasai initially controlled the decision of 
whether or not to subdivide their collective holdings, once the decision was taken, control 
was ceded to an elected and powerful management committee that primarily catered for 
its own interests. Prior rules designed by government to guide the process of group ranch 
subdivision entrenched the influence of the management committee in land allocation. 
Moreover, a lack of accountability amongst state actors, including the judiciary, 
undermined the ability of ordinary Maasai to address distributional conflicts emerging 
out of the allocation process. 
                                                           
1 A group ranch is land that has been demarcated and legally allocated to a group such as a tribe, a clan, 
section, family or other group of persons (Kenya, Republic of, 1968a). The group ranch is composed of a 
body of members to whom legal title has been jointly awarded, and a management committee that is 
elected by the body of members. The management committee is responsible for coordinating and 
implementing development projects on the group ranch. Although land is held in common by all group 
members, certain rights, such as residency rights, are assigned to individuals. The group as a corporate 
body also retains some rights such as control over grazing rights, tillage and water resources. Group 
ranches were introduced in 1968 by the Kenya Government in an attempt to control environmental 




Findings suggest that, because the process by which property rights change is so 
intertwined with politics, we may need to move beyond economic models of relative 
price changes and state enforcement to understand the process more clearly. Models that 
accommodate competition by actors and the possibility that state actors may not provide 
the arbitration or enforcement that is often taken for granted are perhaps more appropriate 
for analyzing the complexities of shifting property rights.  When the possibility for 
conflict and competition is factored into the property rights equation, the relative gains 
from privatizing/individualizing may be not be as large or as obvious as previously 
indicated.  
The first section of this paper presents a theoretical characterization of the process 
of property rights transformation. This section is followed be a description of the group 
ranches and reasons for their creation. Explanations for their dissolution are also 
discussed. The third part of the paper presents the methods used in the study. This is 
followed by a presentation of the empirical results that include a discussion of the 
subdivision procedures, the outcomes of the allocation process, and the emerging 
arrangements following subdivision. The final sections of this paper discuss the findings 
and offer broader policy implications from this case study.  
 
2.  THE PROCESS OF CHANGE: A DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENT TO 
PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFORMATIONS 
Attempts to explain why property regimes may move towards greater 
privatization have generally crystallized around notions of efficiency. Efficiency 
arguments suggest that rational actors will respond to beneficial changes in the external 




gains, especially when they perceive the gains to exceed the costs (negotiation, 
enforcement) of implementing the privatized structure (Demsetz 1967; North and 
Thomas 1973, 1977, 1981). However, economic gains on their own are not necessary or 
sufficient to induce the implementation of alternative property rights arrangements and 
institutions are not always created to be socially efficient (Eggertsson 1990; North 1990).  
Because a rearrangement of property rights involves a reassignment of ownership 
of valuable assets and a re-allocation of decision-making authority, distributional issues 
over the allocation of benefits, such as wealth and power, will be a fundamental concern 
in the transformation of property rights (Platteau 2000, 1998; Firmin-Sellers 1995; 
Knight 1995; Eggertsson 1990; North 1990; Libecap 2003 1998, 1989).  Actors in the 
political milieu will compete to define and re-define the distribution of wealth and power 
in their favor under the new arrangement.  
Potential losers and winners will attempt to protect their benefits under the status 
quo or seek new advantages promised by the new structure. Societal actors with varying 
capacities to influence outcomes will engage in bargaining and negotiation to assert their 
claims and to influence outcomes. Negotiation and bargaining over property rights may 
occur in diverse arenas such as courts, village hearings, local councils, or any societal 
institution that is approached to lend authority to certain property arrangements (Lund 
2002). Thus a careful analysis of this distributional conflict and how it is resolved will 
provide a better understanding of the evolution of property institutions (Libecap 1989; 
Knight 1992; Firmin-Sellers 1996).   
The nature and intensity of distributional conflict is influenced by whether 




the bargaining parties are (Libecap 1989). Both these aspects are heavily dependent on 
the formula used to allocate and distribute benefits. Rents can be divided among 
customary users in proportion to their respective rates of use in the status quo 
arrangement or they can be divided equally among previous rights holders (Platteau 
2000). Proportional division, having higher information requirements, disadvantages low-
intensity users whose membership in the group entitles them to equal use of collective 
resources. Though equal division has low information requirements, it is likely to 
generate intense opposition from individuals who are benefiting disproportionately from 
high-intensity usage of community resources. Scholars seem to suggest that proportional 
division is a more politically desirable alternative (Libecap 1989; Roemer 1989). Others 
would argue that this is an empirical determination that is very much dependent on social 
norms of equity and fairness (Ensminger 1992). 
The outcomes of political bargaining will thus depend both on the power and 
influence of actors as well as on how the proposed distribution of wealth and power will 
blend in with prevailing institutional norms. Institutional change may be slowed and 
indeed blocked if the proposed distribution in the new arrangement is very concentrated 
(Libecap 2003, 1989).  
How is conflict resolved so that the new property rights structure is implemented? 
Some actors may invoke the authority of the state to terminate severe conflicts over 
distribution (Firmin-Sellers 1996). In other cases, powerful actors with a relative 
bargaining advantage are able to constrain others to comply with new institutional rules 
(Knight 1992). How do they do this? Knight argues that the relative bargaining power of 




commitments during bargaining. Weaker parties with less resources, who face higher 
costs in case of extended or a breakdown in bargaining, are less likely to challenge a 
stronger party’s commitment. In addition, threats of retaliatory action from a stronger 
person, though less desirable, may serve to increase pressure on the weaker party to adopt 
a less-preferred alternative. Thus outside of direct state intervention power asymmetries 
can resolve conflicts in social interactions. Nonetheless Knight recognizes the possibility 
of weaker parties having marginal influence, in which case conflict is not resolved and 
instead recurs. 
The above theoretical framework creates several expectations. These include: 
1.  Distributional conflict, determined by the mode of allocation chosen, is greatest 
where the new arrangement concentrates benefits in the hands of a few interests, 
particularly where social norms of fairness dictate a more equitable if not equal 
solution; 
2.  Actors utilize a variety of political institutions, formal and customary, to assert their 
claims so as to achieve the assignment of their preferred property rights; 
3.  Conflict is resolved either through coercion using the instruments of the state or 
through a more decentralized bargaining process among societal actors, but the 
process nonetheless is characterized by an asymmetry of power among the actors. 
The more powerful actors are then able to constrain the choices of weaker ones thus 





THE MAASAI GROUP RANCHES 
The Maasai group ranches are the last of a series of state-driven land interventions 
in Maasailand that began in the early 20
th century.
2 Group ranches were created with the 
expectation that they would provide tenure security and create incentives for the Maasai 
to invest in range improvement and ultimately to reduce the tendency to over-accumulate 
livestock (Republic of Kenya 1974). The program entailed a shift in land tenure from one 
in which the range was under traditional common ownership, to one in which the land 
was sub-divided into portions owned by groups, each of which held title to its own group 
ranch. To implement this development program the Kenyan government sought loans and 
grants from international agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, Swedish aid agency, 
Canadian development agency, and the United Kingdom. The loans were granted under 
the auspices of the Kenya Livestock Development Program (KLDP).  
The objectives of group ranches were to be achieved through: 
•  Registration of permanent members of each ranch who were thus to be excluded 
from other ranches; 
•  Allocation of grazing quotas to members to limit animal numbers to not exceed 
the carrying capacity of the ranches; 
•  Development of shared ranch infrastructure (such as water points, dips, stock 
handling facilities and fire breaks) using loans. Members would pay user fees and 
be collectively responsible for loan repayment; and 
•  Member management of their own livestock, with the ability to obtain loans for 
purchasing breeding stock and cattle for fattening. 
•  A group ranch committee elected to manage all group ranch affairs including: 
y  Overseeing infrastructure development and loan repayments; 
y  Enforcing grazing quotas and grazing management; and 
                                                           
2 The history of Maasai land relations and state intervention has been recounted by various authors: see 




y  Maintaining the integrity of the group ranch boundary. 
Group ranches do not fall under corporate law in Kenya. A separate law, the Land 
Groups (Representatives) Act of 1968, was passed to provide a legal framework for ranch 
operation. This Act provides for greater simplicity, lower costs and lower tax rates in 
handling of group ranch affairs. The entire group holds the title to the ranch, which 
cannot be sold by any of its members. Each individual has residency rights, but the group 
as a corporate body controls the means of production, i.e. grazing, water, and tillage and 
may establish mechanisms for the allocation of the means of production. This it does via 
the elected group ranch committee. The Department of Land Adjudication and the 
Registrar of Group Representatives, both in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement were 
extensively involved in the initial establishment of group ranches. The Range 
Management division of the Ministry of Agriculture played a key role in drawing up 
group ranch development plans. The Ministry of Water Development coordinated water 
development and the Agricultural Finance Corporation administered the loans provided 
by the funders.  
The group ranch concept is now close to its fourth decade, yet there is consensus 
among scholars and planners that this policy innovation is a dismal failure (Galaty and 
Ole Munei 1999; Rutten 1992; Munei 1991). Not only has it failed to meet its stated 
objectives but it has also jeopardized the socio-economic welfare of the Maasai (Kipuri 
1989; Kituyi 1990; Fratkin 1994). There is a growing trend toward subdivision of group 
into individual ranches, and frequent sale of portions of individual holdings to prevent 
foreclosure on development loans (Galaty 1988; Kimani and Pickard 1998). This 




Kajiado district. Demands for subdivision in other parts of the district gained momentum 
by the mid-1980s. By 1985, 22 group ranches had resolved to subdivide; 7 did so (Munei 
1987). By 1996, these 22 group ranches had actually subdivided and individual land titles 
begun to be issued (Kimani and Pickard 1998). 11 other group ranches were in various 
stages of subdivision. By 2000, 31 group ranches had subdivided and been issued titles 
(Mwangi 2003). 14 others resolved to subdivide and were being surveyed and 
demarcated. Only 12 had resisted subdivision.  
Recent research in different group ranch areas in Kajiado District point to a 
diverse set of pressures that motivated Maasai to press for the subdivision of their group 
ranches. Researchers working in the better watered areas of the District, indicate that 
individuals were eager to acquire individual land titles which they would use to access 
capital markets (Galaty 1999, 1980; Kimani and Pickard 1998; Rutten 1992; Grandin 
1987). However, an increasing sense of uncertainty as internal population increased the 
number of individuals entitled to a share in a limited land resource, was also a motivator 
for subdivision (Galaty 1999, 1994, 1993; Kimani and Pickard 1998). This sense of 
insecurity was heightened when outsiders or individuals with no legitimate claim to 
group ranch land were registered and allocated parcels in certain cases where they were 
able to influence the management committee (Ole Simel 1999; Galaty 1993, 1992; Rutten 
1992). Yet in one arid area demands for subdivision are closely tied to the development 
and success of irrigated, commercialized agriculture by resident non-Maasai (Southgate 
and Woodhouse 2000; Woodhouse 1997). The most recent work in four group ranches 
suggests that while subdivision may have provided a way to access land titles, or a 




important in motivating the transition (Mwangi, forthcoming; Mwangi 2005; Mwangi 
2003). Not only were group ranches beset by internal governance pressures and 
difficulties in enforcing collective interests for resource allocation, subdivision appeared 
to be an expedient strategy for protecting individuals’ land claims against threats of 
appropriation by both internal and external actors. 
 
3.  THE STUDY SITES AND METHODS 
The four study sites were selected from one ecological zone, where the conditions 
of soils, vegetation, geology and rainfall, as well as ethnic composition, are relatively 
homogeneous. Four group ranches were selected: Enkaroni group ranch area, Meto group 
ranch area, Nentanai group ranch area, and Torosei group ranch. These were selected to 
include variations in size and location, in proximity to the main livestock marketing 
center of Bissel, and in how far along each was in the subdivision process (See Table 1 
below).  
 
Table 1--Basic information for Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai and Torosei 














Enkaroni  April 1975  11,378 356  May 1988  310  8 (5miles) 
Meto  December 
1977 
28,928 645  Sept 1989  400  65 (40) 
Nentanai   December 
1977 
3696 57  March 
1987 
42 18  (11) 
Torosei  June 1977  45,445 300  Sept 1989  -  56 (35) 
 
Fieldwork was conducted from January 2001 to January 2002 and from June to 




categories, youths, widows and married women. The interviews sought to find out 
whether individuals participated in the decision to subdivide, how parcel sizes and 
locations were determined and distributed, whether dissatisfied individuals contested 
committee allocations, how they organized such contestation, and with what success. 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the proportion of general membership interviewed in each group 
ranch.  
Table 2--Proportion of group ranch members that were interviewed 
  No. of Members 
No. of Members 
Interviewed 
% Interviewed 
Enkaroni 356  48  13 
Meto 645  88  14 
Nentanai  57 30 53 




Table 3--Interviews by age set and gender 








Enkaroni   4 11  20 8  12  2  1  3  17 
Meto  1  6  17 22  13 22  -  1  15  12 
Nentanai   5 10  6  4  1  -  -  6  6 
Torosei    1  16 13  12 33  11  1  4  15 
Total  (334)  1  16  54 61  36 68  13  3  28  50 




Interviews were supplemented with archival material. Group Ranch files (both 
meetings and disputes files) were obtained from Kajiado District’s Land Adjudication 
Department. Meetings files recorded minutes of group ranch Annual General Meetings, 
changes in membership, changes in committees, minutes of committee meetings, and 
communications from the Registrar of Group Ranches and from the Land Control Board. 
The disputes files held correspondence relating to group ranch boundary disputes, 
individual and group complaints over the conduct of subdivision, and minutes of 
arbitration meetings conducted under the umbrella of the District Commissioner’s office. 
The archival search helped provide insights into the process of subdivision, to identify 
key actors and the controversies surrounding the process of subdivision and in particular 
to identify the roles of the different arms of government administration in the process. 
Analysis of interview data is largely qualitative and interpretive.  
 
SUBDIVIDING THE GROUP RANCH: DECISIONS AND PROCEDURES 
The four group ranches adopted similar decision rules and procedures for 
subdividing their lands. One set of procedures was crafted by the Registrar of Group 
Ranches, a government official in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement. The other set of 
procedures was designed and sanctioned by group ranch members when they resolved to 
subdivide. 
Formal procedures from government 
In accordance with the Group Ranch Act, the annual general meeting where group 




group ranches or his representative. Here, the Registrar would outline the government’s 
procedure for dissolution and subdivision as follows: 
First, the official group ranch committee would make a formal application for the 
dissolution of their group ranch to the Registrar of group ranches, which would include a 
KShs 100 (about US$1.20) processing fee and the minutes of the annual general meeting 
at which the majority of the members voted to dissolve their group ranch.  
Second, after verifying that the group ranch title is not charged or borrowed 
against, the Registrar would consent to its subdivision, allowing the group ranch to begin 
survey and demarcation.  
Third, the group ranch would then apply to the district’s Land Control Board for 
further consent to subdivide. The Land Control Board, comprising between 8-12 
individuals, is appointed by the Provincial Commissioner and gazetted by the Minister of 
Lands. It is chaired by the District Commissioner, who is also the head of government 
administration in the district. The secretary of the board is the district representative of 
the National Commissioner of Lands. Other technical individuals include the District 
Land Adjudication Officer, the District Land Registrar and a representative from the local 
authority, the Kajiado County Council. Landowners in the district must comprise three-
quarters of the board and to include both men and women from the community.  
At this stage, the Land Control Board has several responsibilities. It verifies 
whether or not the group ranch title deed is encumbered by loans; it confirms the size of 
land to be subdivided and reasons for its proposed subdivision; it establishes the number 




aside from the land. If satisfied, the board awards its consent for the group ranch to 
undertake subdivision.  
Fourth, after the group ranch has completed demarcation, survey and mapping, 
the Land Control Board provides its consent for the collective group ranch title to be 
discontinued and converted to a series of individual titles by the District Land Registrar. 
But before it does this, the Board must verify that all registered group members have 
been allocated parcels that are relatively equal. It must also determine that there is no 
dispute over the subdivision. It consults landowner representatives on the board and is 
open to disputing parties. The board must verify on the surveyor’s site map that public 
utility areas such as schools, trading centers, water points, health centers, and access 
roads have been set aside. In all decisions the Board depends on advice from technical 
experts such as the District Surveyor and the District Land Adjudication Officer. If 
satisfied, the Board consents to the transfer of title from the collective to the individuals 
and the District Land Registrar is allowed to process land titles.  
Group representatives, usually the committee chair, vice-chair and secretary sign 
the title transfers to individual members once each has paid the necessary processing fees. 
The District Land Registrar will witness this transfer process. Once all titles have been 
transferred, and every member has obtained a title, a meeting will be convened and the 
Registrar of Group Ranches will officially dissolve the incorporated group and its 
representatives.  
Internal Group Ranch procedures for subdivision 
First, members resolved that subdivision be conducted in such a way to ensure 
that all parcels were relatively equal in size except where land was distinctly marginal 




larger parcels would be issued. This allocation formula draws from the Group (Land 
Representatives) Act, which specifies that group ranch land is the property of the 
registered collectivity, held by each member in equal, undivided shares. It also draws 
from shared customary understandings, which consider land an indivisible territory to 
which all recognized users have equal access.  
Second, together with the officially elected committee, group ranch members 
selected an additional group of up to ten individuals to assist the official committee in the 
physical task of demarcating the group ranch. This demarcation committee lasted only for 
as long as it took to physically mark parcel boundaries. 
Third, the group ranch members were to indicate to the official committee the 
areas, in which they preferred to have their parcels located.  
Fourth, members resolved to remain at their current locations until completion of 
subdivision to safeguard against opportunistic relocation to choice areas prior to 
subdivision.  
Fifth, after receiving the consent to subdivide from the Registrar, the group ranch 
engaged a certified surveyor to conduct the on-ground demarcation. Prior to this formal 
survey, however, the official committee and the temporary demarcation committee 
traversed the entire group ranch, marking out individual parcel boundaries using natural 
features such as trees, rivers, rocks and hills as markers. The surveyors then formalized 
and/or rectify these boundaries. Individuals were expected to pay surveyor fees as a 
precondition to being shown their parcels. The fees varied from 1500 KShs (i.e. about 




Meto and 5000 KSh in Nentanai, both of which were surveyed by private surveyors.
3 The 
committee and the surveyor determined survey fees. After the official survey and 
mapping, the committee would then show those group ranch members that had paid 
survey fees the location of their parcels. Individuals would then seek their titles, at a fee, 
from the District Land Registrar.  
WHY DID GROUP RANCH MEMBERS EXPECT AN EQUAL SUBDIVISION? 
Group ranch members endorsed the subdivision before obtaining unambiguous 
information and/or guarantees on the attributes of land that would be allocated to them. 
They also did not place restrictions on the bounds of committee action nor determine 
ways of bringing the committee to account in case it failed to fulfill their expectations. 
This is a significant omission because individuals’ livelihoods and the viability of the 
livestock enterprise, both of which are dependent on access to adequate land resources, 
were at stake. Some insights can be gained from examining the criteria that members 
used to elect the official committee and later the demarcation committee.  
In selecting their committees, both the official management committee mandated 
by the Group Ranch Act and the temporary demarcation committee, group members 
prized personal qualities such as honesty, integrity, sense of justice or fairness, industry, 
good behavior, and oratory skills, which they had observed from repeated interactions 
with the individuals. Some individuals elected to the committee were drawn from the 
                                                           
3 Torosei has not yet engaged a surveyor—persistent droughts and heavy cattle losses have made it difficult 
for members to raise survey fees. The committee in Torosei is now approaching one wealthy Kajiado 
business man, who also owns land in Torosei to loan them an initial amount that would get the surveyor 
started on the ground. Nentanai members also had a problem raising survey and even title fees. The 
committee here received a loan from a neighboring cement manufacturer to get the survey process going. 
Those who could not afford to repay the loan were paid for by their friends and families in return for 
allowing the lender free grazing until the full amount is recovered. Some however opted to sell part or all of 




traditional leadership structure and were age set leaders (ilaiguenani) or deputies to age 
set leaders (inkopirr). Others were chosen because they were educated and had record-
keeping skills which were considered critical for the group ranches’ external relations 
with government and with financiers. This was usually the case for the positions of 
secretary and treasurer.  Group ranch management committees were thus a unique blend 
of traditional/customary authority and formal legal authority given force by the Land Act. 
The management committees had also initiated, supervised, and maintained infrastructure 
projects within their respective group ranches and thus had a good track record. 
The demarcation committee, which lasted only for as long as it took to physically 
demarcate boundary parcels, was selected using similar criteria to that of the official 
committee. Personal integrity, fairness, and industry were valued attributes. To these 
attributes were added other practical considerations such as achieving adequate clan and 
age set balance across both committees as well as ensuring that all the settlement regions 
within each group ranch were represented. Many individuals regarded the demarcation 
committee as an avenue to guard against any biases the management committee might 
have during subdivision.
4 
The criteria by which individuals were chosen to the two committees amount to a 
vetting procedure that, when combined with the bureaucratic controls of the district’s 
Land Control Board, theoretically provided a sound way of reducing uncertainty and 
building confidence that outcomes would indeed meet individuals’ expectations. Thus 
group ranch members, to the extent possible, established a system that was based on 
                                                           





5, reputation, and on past experience, which was expected to provide a 
measure of accountability among those they had entrusted with the responsibility of 
subdividing their land.  
THE SUBDIVIDED GROUP RANCH: “FINGERS ON THE HAND ARE NOT 
EQUAL” 
Table 4 below provides a synopsis of the parcel sizes and their distribution among 
group ranch members following subdivision. 
Table 4--Summary of Parcel Sizes in Enkaroni, Meto and Nentanai 
  Enkaroni Meto  Nentanai 
Area (ha)  11802.5 27358.02  4038.48 
No. of Members  332 548 56 
Average parcel size 
after subdivision 
35.56 49.92 72.12 
Largest Parcel (ha)  200.5 152.79  214 
Smallest Parcel (ha)  3.6 4.27  14.21 
Gini Coefficient  .380 .233 .399 
Coefficient of 
variation 
.877 .445 .743 
Other Info:  64% of members have 
less than average 
parcel size. 
25% of former group 
ranch land is now 
owned by 9% of the 
former members. 
13 individuals with 
single digit parcels. 
Committee members 
(i.e. 10 individuals) 
own 9% of former 
group ranch land. 
Committee average= 
100ha. 
60% of members have 
less than average 
parcel size. 
35% of former group 
ranch land is now 
owned by 9% of the 
former members. 
1 individual with 
single digit parcel. 
Committee members 
(i.e. 10 individuals) 
own 4% of former 
group ranch land. 
Committee average= 
113ha. 
63% of members 
have less than 
average parcel size. 
26% of former group 
ranch land is now 





(i.e. 10 individuals) 
own 30% of former 





                                                           
5 Spencer (1997) observes that kinship, age-set systems and networks of trust have provided constrains that 
curb the ‘opportunities of individuals to exploit others for personal gain.’ The concepts of trustworthiness 





6 indicate that contrary to members’ expectations the subdivision did 
not result in equal or near equal parcels. In all three group ranches where subdivision was 
completed and formalized via surveying, mapping, and the issuance of land titles (i.e. in 
Enkaroni, Meto, and Nentanai) 60 percent or more of the registered members have parcel 
sizes that fall below the averages. More than 25 percent of former group ranch land is 
now owned by 9 percent of its registered members. Moreover, committee members who 
spearheaded the subdivision exercise and who were expected to conduct the subdivision 
fairly, ended up owning between 4–30 percent of the land that they were entrusted to 
subdivide. The average sizes of committee members’ parcels following subdivision were 
100 ha for Enkaroni (as compared to an average of 36 ha), 113 ha for Meto (as compared 
to an average of 50 ha) and 133 ha for Nentanai (as compared to a 72 ha average). 
Committee parcels were thus more than twice the average size of ordinary members’ 
parcels. 
Committee members allocated large parcels to themselves, to individuals with 
close ties and affinities to committee members, and to wealthy individuals with large 
livestock herds, who were able to ‘entertain’ the committee by giving them gifts of 
livestock.
7 Those who could not ‘entertain’ the committee, notably the poor livestock 
herders, did not succeed in negotiating a preferred parcel size and ended with 
considerably smaller sized parcels. Widows too received small parcels, as they were 
unable to defend their claims.
8 Those with disagreements, personal or political, with the 
committee had no space to negotiate—they were punished with smaller sized parcels.  
                                                           
6 Torosei not included because they have not formally subdivided thus parcel sizes are not confirmed. 
7 Interviews: ENK/70/2001, ENK/8/2001 
8 Out of the 17 widows that were allocated land in Enkaroni, 12 have land below the group ranch average. 




The outcome of subdivision favored wealthy cattle owners and committee 
members. A simple Pearson’s product moment correlation between land allocated after 
subdivision and livestock holdings suggests that both size of parcel and livestock
9 
holdings vary positively together in Enkaroni, Meto, and Nentanai (Table 5). For cattle, 
in particular, the association is always significant and relatively strong.  
Table 5--Correlations between Land and Livestock  
  Cows Goats Sheep 
Enkaroni 
     Pearson correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 














     Pearson correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 














     Pearson correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 













*correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Group ranch members’ demands for equal allocation and distribution of land 
occurs against the backdrop of severe inequalities between families/households’ livestock 
wealth. So why would they demand equal allocation? Inequalities in livestock holdings 
amongst Maasai are not a new phenomenon (Waller 1999; Bekure and Grandin 1991; 
Bill and Anderson 1980; Jahnke et al. 1972). But today’s circumstance is radically 
different from that which prevailed in colonial or pre-colonial times, or possibly even 
during the phase of group ranching. In prior times, though livestock holdings were 
                                                                                                                                                                             
remarry their land would be lost to the deceased’s family. This fear was more acute in the event that the 
widow was re-married to an ‘outsider.’ 
9 The size and distribution of holdings was derived directly by asking the interviewee. These have not been 
verified by direct census and must be treated with caution as it is fairly uncommon for the Maasai to reveal 




unequal, and though there was competition for prime grazing land and water among 
individuals, land was available and accessible to all Maasai as a birthright.  
Though individual herds varied according to stochastic events such as drought, 
epidemics and raiding, and according to individual livestock management skills (Waller, 
personal communication 1999; Halderman 1989), land resources were available to all and 
the extent of mobility generally determined access. There was fluidity in livestock 
holdings among rich and poor herders alike. But with time, as significant portions of 
Maasailand were appropriated at different times by different actors for different reasons 
(Mwangi, forthcoming; Mwangi 2003; Campbell 1993; Rutten 1995, 1992; Halderman 
1989), land became a scarce resource assuming an ever more critical role in the Maasai 
livestock economy. Where previously an individual may have had a fair chance of rapidly 
accumulating or losing herds on an available land base, currently an individual’s ability 
to accumulate is strongly limited by the availability of land. The demand for equal land 
allocation is a strong reflection of this changed context and the cultural norm that land 
belongs to all Maasai as their birthright. 
“Malalamiko ya Beacon:”  Contesting the undesired outcome 
In Enkaroni, those dissatisfied with the outcome organized to challenge the 
committee’s allocations. They included widows, men with small-sized parcels, and others 
who had altogether missed being allocated parcels. This group of about 50 was referred 
to as the ‘ kikundi cha malalamiko ya beacon’ or beacon complainants group.  They 
approached the committee to re-negotiate parcel size but were told that ‘the fingers on 
one hand are not equal.’ How then did they expect everyone to get equal sized parcels? 




The complainants’ group then approached the elders and asked them to appeal to 
the committee over the unequal allocations. The elders’ barazas or public meetings were 
unfruitful. The elders did not have sufficient powers to overwrite committee decisions, 
and in any case they had a vested interest in the outcome.  
They complainants then appealed to officials in the Department of Lands 
Adjudication and Settlement. But the Department adopted an attitude of non-interference 
in matters of group ranch subdivision. The District Land Adjudication Officer had on two 
prior occasions stated that the determination of parcel sizes depended entirely on the 
group ranch and that complaints be directed to the committee and not to his office 
because ‘all facts related to cases are present in Enkaroni.’
10 The District Officer of 
Kajiado Central Division reiterated this position.  
Many individuals believed that their appeals to government officials went 
unheeded because of a lack of accountability. One letter of February 19, 1990 from a 
widow to the district commissioner is instructive. Not only does she complain of 
exceedingly small parcel size (her 15 hectares as compared to committee members’ 
average of 300 acres), but cites that ‘government officers are corrupt and take bribes.’
11 
She also accused the committee of corruption and misuse of powers. General evidence of 
group ranch members’ dissatisfaction comes from a letter dated February 9, 1990 written 
jointly by an unidentified number of members, which was addressed to a broad range of 
Government Officials including the District Range Officer, the District Commissioner, 
District Officer of Central Division, Member of Parliament of Kajiado central, the 
                                                           
10 Minutes, Enkaroni Annual General Meeting, 10
th July 1991. Meetings File, Enkaroni Group Ranch. 
Department of Land Adjudication, Kajiado District 
11 Letter written by Nenkitai ene Lolkinyei, 19
th February 1990. Disputes File, Enkaroni Group Ranch. 




location Councilor, District Land Adjudication officer and the Chief of Enkaroni 
location. In this letter the members complained that:
12 
1.  People in leadership, i.e. committee and chiefs, have allocated themselves huge 
chunks of land; 
2.  Committee has failed to subdivide the ranch in an equitable manner; 
3.  Close friends, relatives, and in-laws of the committee are given bigger portions of 
land; 
4.  Committee never willing to listen to members’ complaints (heavy-handedness); 
5.  Chiefs are blocking people from pursuing further measures (i.e. seeking redress at 
alternative fora);  
6.  The chairman is demanding that those with personal differences with him must kneel 
down and beg for mercy; 
7.  There is bribery; 
8.  Some members are allowed to participate in committees’ private meetings; others are 
not; and 
9.  Some unregistered people have been given ranches by the committee without 
members’ knowledge. 
This letter went unheeded and the complainants appealed to the High Court as a 
final recourse to justice. On May 21, 1990 a lawyer, writing on their behalf to the group 
ranch chairman, cited that his clients had been allocated small pieces of land while some 
other group members had been allocated large chunks of land. The lawyer said that 
unless the chairman confirmed that their clients’ complaints would be investigated within 
                                                           
12 Unnamed author, 9
th February 1990. Disputes File, Enkaroni Group Ranch. Department of Land 




fourteen days from the receipt of his letter his clients would apply to the High Court for 
an injunction to terminate subdivision. In a rejoinder, dated May 24, 1990, the group 
ranch chairman acknowledged that complaints of unequal subdivision had been brought 
to his attention and to that of administrative authorities, but that he and his committee 
were ‘unaware of your clients discontent.’  
The chairman suggested that: 
1.  Clients bring specific grievances/complaints to the committee 
2.  Failing 1 above to notify DC (District Commissioner) through area chiefs and locaDO 
(District Officer) 
3.  Revert to you and to communicate to us on your views 
‘In the case of a complete collapse of arbitration, the option of the court remains.’ 
From the previous accounts it is clear that the complainants had followed the 
channel suggested by the committee, and quite obviously had failed. Six members from 
this group did eventually launch their case in the High Court against the group ranch 
committee who are the legal representatives of Enkaroni group ranch.
13 The plaintiffs’ 
demands and accusations were as follows: 
1.  Land be allocated equally among all its members. 
2.  Land subdivision carried out on group ranch be declared null and void 
3.  Subdivision should be halted until suit is heard 
4.  That the group committee is subdividing land in a discriminatory manner. 
5.  Plaintiffs had been allocated small land parcels while other members had been 
allocated large parcels of land. 
                                                           
13 Plaint, Civil Suit 3956 of 1992, 22




A ruling by High Court justice Akilano Akiwumi dismissed, with cost, the plaintiffs’ 
application for an injunction.
14 The justice ruled that: 
6.  The plaintiffs should show, prima facie, why it is wrong that they have been allocated 
smaller land parcels than others. The burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the 
discriminatory subdivision is for some cogent reason for instance, wrong, unlawful, 
or contrary to the objections of the defendant. This has not been shown. 
7.  The annexure to the affidavit of the plaintiff seem to show that it is rather the District 
Land Adjudication and Survey Officer, the survey officer and the local chief who 
might be accused, if anything of unfair distribution of land, if it is so. 
8.  The plaintiff must show beyond mere allegation that they have been given smaller 
portions of land than those given to others. What are the actual sizes of the portions of 
land involved? There is no evidence of this. 
9.  The plaintiffs have not made out a prima facie case with a probability of success. 
They have shown no reason to support their allegation of discriminatory subdivision 
and why they should not have been allocated what they were given. 
10. Plaintiffs’ application for injunction dismissed with cost. 
 
Following this ruling, which represented their final recourse to justice, the 
complainants conceded defeat. They did not re-organize to appeal the High Court’s 
ruling, as they realized no help was forthcoming. Their advocate advised them to give up 
the case because ‘everybody was against them including the registrar of the High Court 
who is a member of Enkaroni and whose shamba is among the big ones.’
15 
During this contestation the committee threatened to withdraw land that had 
already been allocated to the complainants and their supporters, or to reduce further the 
                                                           
14 Ruling, Civil Case 3956 of 1992. 31
st July 1992. High Court of Kenya. 




size of parcels allocated to them. The committee also allegedly secretly increased the 
parcel sizes of some selected individuals within the group of complainants. These 
selective allocations eroded group cohesion and resulted in a systematic decline of the 
complainants’ group size from about fifty individuals to about six individuals. This group 
of six is the one that eventually launched an appeal to the courts. 
In Meto, individuals dissatisfied with their parcel sizes complained individually. 
Those who confronted the committee were threatened that their parcels would be 
withdrawn and re-distributed to others or that their parcels would be further reduced.  
Some individuals chose not to confront the committee because they found others with 
even smaller parcels, and felt they were better off not to complain. The Meto group ranch 
committee also reminded group ranch members that by raising objections subdivision 
might be suspended as in several neighboring group ranches. Organizing to contest 
committee decisions was a big challenge in Meto, not only because of committee 
intimidation but also because it is a large group ranch over which people are thinly 
scattered.  
In Nentanai, individuals did not contest their committees’ unequal allocation. The 
Nentanai group ranch neighbors the Ilpartimaru group ranch, where the process of 
subdivision has been delayed for close to a decade owing to distributional conflict. 
Indeed, Nentanai has provided refuge to residents fleeing escalating conflict in 
Ilpartimaru. Even if discontented individuals wanted to organize, it would have been 
difficult. Many of those allocated small parcels were the poorest and had migrated to 




BEYOND INEQUALITY: RE-AGGREGATING INDIVIDUALIZED PARCELS 
An emerging post-subdivision strategy is the re-negotiation of access rights to 
resources (such as pasture) that have now been individualized and secured under a single, 
titled owner.  Individuals are pursuing several distinct strategies, separately or 
concurrently. They are re-aggregating their individualized parcels and pursing joint 
pasturing and herd management, primarily amongst neighbors, within families, and in 
some instances amongst friends whose parcels are not necessarily adjacent to each other. 
In addition, some individuals with small herds and excess pastures now lease out parts of 
their parcels to those with insufficient pasture resources. Parcel owners have also 
continued with the Maasai practice of re-distributing herds amongst friends and kin. 
Table 6 below provides a summary of these arrangements and their frequencies in the 
individualized areas of Enkaroni, Meto, and Nentanai.  








between friends, neighbors, 
family, in-laws. 
6   (13%)  42 (55%)  11 (44%) 
Don’t have sharing 
arrangements. 
40  (87%)  32 (42%)  9  (33%) 
(an additional 4 don’t 
live on their parcels and 
neighbors graze freely) 
Pasture Leases.  8   (17%)  4 (5%)  0 (0%) 
Re-distributed herds with 
friends, family, in-laws. 
20 (43%)  29 (38%) 
(2 not indicated) 
9 (36%) 
(1 not indicated) 
*Most interviewees admitted to allowing others into their pastures during times of drought and stress. 
 
Those individuals who did not opt for joint management actively enforced their 
boundaries. Because livestock and land were unequal, they feared joint strategies would 
leave them open to exploitation by those with larger herds. By re-aggregating, and 




times, those individuals that pursued a re-aggregation strategy are attempting to access 
the complement of pasture and water they find necessary for livestock production under a 
radically altered property structure.  
Though the content of the leasing and sharing arrangements beg for greater 
elaboration, these findings are instructive. First, they reinforce arguments made 
elsewhere that subdivision may have been a defensive strategy to protect against 
unsanctioned appropriations. Maximizing production may not be the only or primary 
reason that individuals privatize resource rights. Second, the transition to individual units 
in an environment that is characterized by variability is inherently unstable. In their 
attempts to enhance the viability of their production system in such an ecologically 
fragile circumstance, Maasai are beginning to renegotiate and trade their rights of access, 
of resource withdrawal, and resource management amongst themselves. Each individual 
title holder retains the right to dispose/alienate his resource.  
 
4.  DISCUSSION 
  Subdividing a total of about 90,000 hectares of variously endowed group 
ranch land among 1,400 registered members by about 40–80 committee members of the 
respective group ranches of  Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai, and Torosei  was a difficult task. 
However, when the exercise was completed, parcels were found to be unequal, with more 
than 60 percent of registered members having holdings substantially smaller than the 
average. Land was concentrated in the hands of committee members, their friends, 
relatives, and wealthy herders. Group members dissatisfied with this outcome contested 




government administration, and to the courts. They did not win. Others, fearing 
victimization by a vengeful committee, or due to lack of resources, did not organize to 
contest the outcomes. 
This paper sought to answer the question of how group ranch members who 
supposedly carefully set up a subdivision process lost control of it and failed to achieve 
the outcomes they desired. As illustrated, the process of group ranch subdivision had 
components that were internal to the group ranch in which rules, procedures, and 
decisions were crafted by group members and/or their representatives. It also had an 
external component designed and controlled by state representatives and/or individuals 
selected by them. The external component included dispute resolution procedures in the 
High Court as an outcome of subdivision. 
The internal processes were set in motion by a members’ majority vote to 
subdivide. This included a shared understanding of the principles of subdivision that 
would lead to a desired outcome, an equal or near equal allocation of parcels. Members 
also endorsed representation by their management committee to oversee the process of 
subdivision, and a temporary demarcation committee to assist it. Customary norms of 
trust, reputation, and a good track record in implementing projects such as construction of 
earth dams and boreholes led members to believe that their expectations would be 
fulfilled.  
The subdivision component external to the group ranch involved acquiring 
consent from relevant actors, primarily government officials, to enable the formal survey 
and the registration and titling of emerging individual parcels. The group ranch 




Even though the initial choice to subdivide was made by group ranch members, 
critical decisions and rules were also made in the external process. The Land Control 
Board was expected to enforce equality or near equality of parcels and solve disputes 
over allocation prior to formalizing the subdivision. It failed to do this. Appeals to its 
members and other officials in government were fruitless. Considerable concern was 
expressed over the responsibility and accountability of these officials.   
Failure of government left extensive discretion to the committee who unilaterally 
determined the sizes of land parcels, where to locate individuals after subdivision, and 
most importantly, ensured their role as signatories to the emerging land titles. The 
committee had legal recognition through the Group Ranch Act and state sponsorship. Its 
influence and authority also derived legitimacy from traditional customary institutions. 
Beyond this it had a privileged knowledge and understanding of the process; a process 
that is unprecedented in Maasai history.  
Conflict over distribution in property rights assignment was terminated by a 
credible and powerful committee, which constrained ordinary group ranch members from 
pursuing their preferred solution. Where committee power was challenged, conflict was 
ended by invoking the coercive power of the state, forcing contesting individuals to 
comply with the new assignment. 
Yet the new structure saw rational individuals, including the losers, “cutting their 
losses” (predicted as a post-transformational outcome by Firmin-Sellers 1996, 1995) and 
choosing to re-contract their bundles of rights to suit their production system. The process 
of transformation did not necessarily end with the acquisition of titles.  This re-




common to private property may not represent a more efficient form of rights in certain 
situations. Equally significantly it reiterates the fact that property rights comprise a 
bundle of rights—including even private, individual property (Meinzen-Dick et al 1997; 
Ostrom 1992; Bromley 1991). 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
That the process of land allocation would be captured by the elite in society is not 
surprising. Bates (1989) shows that during land registration in colonial Kenya, educated 
and administrative elites were allocated larger land units. They understood the colonizers’ 
language and law. In Botswana, leaseholds were granted to large livestock owners 
(Thomas et al. 2000; Little 1999; Peters 1987); in Rajasthan in India, the land reforms of 
1952 resulted in former common lands being transferred to wealthy families (Jodha 1992, 
1987); in Senegal range privatization advantaged wealthy cattle owners (Thebaud et al. 
1995), just as it did in Cameroon (Goheen 1988). 
But what can we make of this process of subdivision in the group ranches that 
were studied? And what are its broader implications? Regardless of the reasons 
motivating individuals to seek a reassignment of rights, the process of reassignment itself 
is characterized by conflict over the eventual distribution of rights because the ‘losers’ 
will contest the outcome. Similarly, those with power and influence will employ these 
resources to ensure their preferred outcome. In the end, it is this latter group that wins and 
prior collective resources become concentrated in the hands of a subset of the original 
claimants. Customary constraints by themselves are insufficient protection against self-




the process are crafted both by internal and external agents, and where the allocation 
process is one-off and conducted in secret. Indeed, when such a process is embedded in 
an administrative regime with a poor accountability record, a skewed allocation response 
can only be expected. State enforcement cannot be taken for granted; the activities of 
state actors may actively impede movement towards supposedly more ‘efficient’ systems.  
How could outcomes have been improved? Methods of asset distribution exist 
that have promise for constraining self-interest and minimizing personal bias and 
prejudices. The lottery system is one avenue. In Mexico land allocation following the 
subdivision of Ejidos was conducted via a lottery system for land that was not variable in 
productivity, and allocation avoided altogether where resources were heterogeneous and 
unpredictable (Munoz-Pina et al 2003). In Senegal on the other hand, land of 
heterogeneous quality was also allocated via a lottery system, but with the added caveat 
that all rights holders received both good and poor quality land (Bloch 1993). Similar 
systems could have been employed to allocate group ranch land, qualified by family size. 
These observations in Mexico and Senegal, and the difficulties experienced during group 
ranch subdivision suggest that a politically favorable allocation outcome must be 
sensitive to spatial heterogeneities in resource distribution and must also reasonably 
conform to the differences in resource appropriation by the various production units.  
Indeed, it seems the case that post subdivision asset allocation is faced by strong 
pressures to maintain pre-subdivision wealth distributions. These economic pressures 
seem to override ideological notions of equality and fair play even in small societies 




The general point of this paper is that the move to private, individualized land 
holdings that have been so important in the economic development of some societies is 
fraught with procedural problems that could undermine the potential economic gains that 
had been hoped for. Resources that could have been employed in productive activities are 
instead dissipated in the race to capture rents during the transition. Moreover, under 
variable ecological conditions, the allocation outcome itself might result in instability of 
holdings, necessitating re-contracting among individuals and groups, yet again 
questioning the very notion of efficiency that is closely associated with a shift towards 
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